By: Brittany Flaherty Theis
Below is a News & Knowledge update written by Whitt Law Attorney Brian R. Bare.
Today the Illinois Supreme Court issued its opinion in Beggs v. Board of Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186, previously discussed on our website in this post. To recap, the teacher was dismissed by the Murphysboro Board of Education (“Board of Education”) for problems with tardiness and unpreparedness after receiving a notice to remedy. After the hearing, the independent hearing officer made findings of fact and issued a recommendation that she be reinstated to her position, suggesting that a second “final warning” would be appropriate. Despite that, the Board of Education voted to uphold its prior dismissal.
Ms. Beggs sought administrative review in the Jackson County Circuit Court, which reversed her dismissal. The Board of Education appealed to the Fifth District of the Appellate Court of Illinois, which affirmed the circuit court. It was the first appellate court decision published in Illinois to interpret the new statutory language and procedure for dismissals for cause.
In 2011, the Illinois legislature changed the School Code provision on dismissals for cause through two key pieces of legislation, the “Public Education Reform Act” or “PERA,” and “Senate Bill 7.” Before the changes, the School Code provided that a hearing officer’s decision was final in all Illinois school districts except Chicago Public Schools. In Chicago, as of 2011, the hearing officer only made non-binding findings of fact and recommendations that were subject to a final decision by the board of education. Senate Bill 7 made the procedures for dismissals in downstate school districts much more similar to the procedures followed by Chicago Public Schools. Hearing officers in downstate teacher dismissal cases now issue non-binding findings of fact and recommendations that are submitted to the local board of education for review and final action. The Fifth District acknowledged these changes, but ultimately held that reviewing courts should grant some level of deference to the hearing officer’s findings and recommendation.
In today’s opinion, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Fifth District’s analysis and set forth a number of holdings that will apply to tenured teacher dismissals for cause in Illinois going forward. The Supreme Court noted that “the plain statutory language . . . provides that the decision of the school board is the final decision for purposes of administrative review.” The Court acknowledged the long history of Illinois courts granting deference to the administrative agency upon review. Based on that, the Court held that “the attendant deference to the agency’s final decision,” i.e. the final decision of the local board of education, “applies with equal force here.”
The Supreme Court held that the new statutory language directing a reviewing court to “give consideration to” both the school board’s decision and the hearing officer’s findings “simply reinforces the existing statutory and case law requirement that the court on administrative review should consider the entire record.” The Court further noted that this applies even where decisions on witness credibility are at issue.
Next, the Supreme Court announced the applicable standards of review that courts should apply. First, the court must “review the [local board of education’s] supplemental factual findings, as well as the factual findings of the hearing officer that were incorporated unmodified into the [school board’s] decision, to determine whether those findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.” This is the highest standard of review and thus grants the most deference to the local school board’s factual findings. Second, the court “must determine whether the findings of fact provide a sufficient basis for the [local board of education’s] conclusion that cause for discharge does or does not exist,” and “apply the clearly erroneous standard of review to this mixed question of fact and law.” This is an intermediate standard of review, which still grants a level of deference to the school board’s decision.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court applied these standards to the dismissal of Ms. Beggs. The Court ruled that the Murphysboro Board of Education’s decision to dismiss her for cause was not adequately supported, although the Board of Education’s frustration with her conduct was “understandable and well documented.”
The attorneys at Whitt Law are watching this area of law as it rapidly evolves and we presented arguments yesterday in a tenured teacher dismissal case currently pending on appeal. We advise school districts to address potential teacher dismissals on a case-by-case basis and are available to advise school districts of their options based on the status of the law at that time. Please contact Whitt Law Attorney Brian R. Bare if you have questions about Beggs v. Board of Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186 described above or need advice regarding employment decisions within your school district.
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